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The Underused Power of Jury
Nullification
Dave Hall
Jury nullification is an inherent and powerful prerogative of
the American jury, yet it is rarely used. This brief article defends
the practice of jury nullification as an important lever for
obtaining justice in our legal system, arguing that juries ought to
exercise their power to nullify more frequently than they do.
In mounting this defense, this article first outlines the history
of nullification before presenting some of the traditional
justifications for its use. It then considers a new model for
justifying nullification proposed by Professor Paul D. Butler.
In its last two sections, this article examines—and finds
inadequate—some of the main criticisms levied against juries’
power to nullify, before finally offering a simple and elegant
formulation for determining when nullification is proper.

2

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 3
I. THE CENTRAL MORAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR NULLIFICATION . 3
A. The “Unjust Law” Justification ..................................... 4
B. The “Unjust Application” Justification ......................... 5
C. The “Abuse of Power” Justification ............................... 6
II. A NEW MODEL FOR NULLIFICATION ..................................... 7
III. SOME OF THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST NULLIFICATION.......... 8
A. The “Technical” Arguments........................................... 8
B. The “Philosophical” Arguments .................................. 13
IV. A METHOD FOR DETERMINING THE PERMISSIBILITY OF JURY
NULLIFICATION ........................................................................ 15
CONCLUSION ............................................................................ 17

3

INTRODUCTION
In an attempt to relate to a colleague the nature of the
American jury’s relationship to its power of nullification,1 Above
the Law editor Elie Mystal chose a comic-book metaphor: he
explained that the jury’s ability to nullify is not a right granted to
it, but is instead an inherent power, like Wolverine’s adamantium
claws.2 Now, a close reading of the original text of the Marvel
comic books would insist that Wolverine’s true inherent power is
his healing ability—the adamantium in his claws was implanted
by a mad scientist3—but the metaphor nevertheless paints not
just a vivid, but an insightful picture.
The metaphor, in other words, is perhaps not correct, but it is
nonetheless true. That description can also be fairly applied to
decisions made by juries when they exercise their inherent
nullification powers: the results may not be legally “correct,” at
least not within a narrow, blind application of the law, but they
may nevertheless express a deep truth. This article explores that
tension in an attempt to investigate the power of an American
jury to shape society and the law through the use of nullification.
Particularly, this article considers some arguments against
nullification and suggests a possible standardizing parameter for
determining the appropriateness of nullification.
I. THE CENTRAL MORAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR NULLIFICATION
Scholars of the subject agree that the concept of jury
nullification within the Anglo-American legal tradition finds its
1 “Jury nullification” is a label applied to the outcome when a jury acquits a
defendant even though it believes the defendant committed the charged crime.
Some of the reasons for this sort of acquittal are discussed in detail below.
2 Radiolab: Null and Void, WNYC STUDIOS (May 12, 2017),
https://www.wnycstudios.org/story/null-and-void.
3 See Charles Soule, Death of Wolverine: The Weapon X Program #3 (MARVEL
COMICS Dec, 2014); Charles Claremont, Wolverine #3 (MARVEL COMICS Nov.
1982).
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origin in William Penn’s trial for unlawful assembly in London in
1670.4 The elements of the charged crime were all present: in
England at the time, it was a violation of the Conventicle Act of
1664 to convene a religious assembly not sponsored by the Church
of England.5 And there was no dispute as to the material facts:
Penn did not deny that he’d drawn a crowd, nor that he was
giving a religious speech not sanctioned by the established
Church.
Yet Penn urged the jury to find him not guilty—not because
his actions were legal, but because he claimed the law prohibiting
them was not.6 After lengthy deliberation, the jurymen returned
with a verdict of not guilty.7 And though they did not articulate
the reasoning underlying their opinion, it appears that they
agreed with Penn’s assessment; after all, the weight of the
evidence seemed so clearly to lie against a “not guilty” decision
that the judge in the case held the jury in contempt, fining them
“forty marks each” for their verdict.8
A. The “Unjust Law” Justification
The origin story here is crucial because the jurors’ decision in
the trial of William Penn appears to have been guided by a moral
judgment, rather than a strictly legal one. It contains a strand of
argument still found in support of nullification today: juries
4 Paul D. Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the
Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 701 (1995); Simon Stern, Between
Local Knowledge and National Politics: Debating Rationales for Jury
Nullification After Bushell's Case, 111 YALE L.J. 1815, 1822 (2002).
5 Steve Bachmann, Starting Again with the Mayflower . . . England’s Civil
War and America’s Bill of Rights, 20 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 193, 209 (2000).
6 JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF
DEMOCRACY 69 (1994).
7 See Stern, supra note 4, at 1823.
8 Id. The Penn trial, with the ensuing jury fines, forms the core of what is
now known as Bushell’s Case, after one of the jurors who refused to pay his
fine. Bushell remained imprisoned until his case reached the Court of Common
Pleas, where presiding judge John Vaughan ruled that a jury’s decisions could
be neither dictated nor punished by the trial judge. Id.
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should refuse to find people guilty of bad laws. Perhaps the
leading example of this practice in the United States was the
refusal of northern juries to find abolitionists guilty of violating
the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act.9 In those cases, the question was not
whether the defendants had harbored runaway slaves—they
had—the question was whether a law that so demeaned human
dignity as to treat human beings like property ought ever to be
applied.10 It oughtn’t. In refusing to convict for violating an
immoral law, these juries (perhaps unknowingly) carried on the
tradition begun in the Penn trial some 200 years prior: juries
found they had the innate power to declare that even though a
defendant had violated the law, she should not be punished when
the law itself violated a deeper principle of justice.
B. The “Unjust Application” Justification
The second main moral justification calls for nullification not
when the law is unjust on its own terms, but when its application
to the present facts would be unjust. There is no clear class of
cases demonstrating this justification; by definition, juries nullify
under this principle because of the specific circumstances of the
defendant demand special treatment.
For example, if a mother broke into her neighbor’s apartment
to use the telephone that she knew was inside so that she could
call an ambulance for her deathly sick child, a jury might choose
not to convict her for the unlawful breaking and entering. The
question isn’t whether she broke the law (she did). But nor is it
whether the law was an unjust law (it’s not; society benefits by
prohibiting people from breaking into each other’s homes).
Instead, the question is whether it would be morally correct to
strictly apply the law in this particular instance. And in the case
of a parent caring for a dying child, a jury may find that the moral
case for mercy mitigates against punishment, even if the jury is
convinced the parent committed the crime.
9

Abramson, supra note 6, at 80–85.
Id.

10
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C. The “Abuse of Power” Justification
The third traditional basis for justifying nullification is in
instances of government abuse or overreach. As with the second
basis, application of this justification is dependent on the specific
facts of the case. It is possible that the OJ Simpson verdict
represents nullification of this type. 11 Possibly, the jurors
believed that Mr. Simpson had murdered his ex-wife and her
friend, but were sufficiently angered by the Los Angeles Police
Department’s (and perhaps particularly by Detective Mark
Fuhrman’s) racism that they brought a verdict of acquittal as a
rebuke against a governmental authority that seemed to have
overstepped its lawful bounds.
Here, the question is not whether the defendant did it (by his
own If I Did It account, it certainly appears that he did12), nor is
the question whether the law against murder is unjust (it is not).
Nor even is the question whether it is unjust to apply the law
against murder to this individual defendant in his circumstances
(at least, no public reasoning of this sort has been proffered).
Instead, the question here is whether it is just to acquit a
defendant the jury believes is guilty, in order to signal to the
government that illegal overreach will not be tolerated by the
governed. In some cases, juries appear to decide that it is.
11 It is at least equally possible that the jury in that case simply didn’t feel
that the prosecution had met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Perhaps they were persuaded by Johnnie Cochran’s “if it doesn’t fit, you must
acquit” line of reasoning. Or perhaps they did feel Simpson was guilty and
nullified, but for a different reason.
12 See generally O.J. SIMPSON, IF I DID IT: CONFESSIONS OF THE KILLER
(Beaufort Books 2007). The book was originally titled only IF I DID IT, but the
subtitle was added by the Goldman family after ownership of the book’s rights
was transferred to them as part of the civil judgment against Simpson. Jennifer
E. Rothman, The Inalienable Right of Publicity, 101 GEO. L.J. 185, 189 n. 19
(2012).
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II. A NEW MODEL FOR NULLIFICATION
Georgetown Law professor Paul D. Butler propounds a fourth
moral argument that is similar to the arguments concerning
unjust laws, unjustly-applied laws, and governmental abuse, but
with a particular cant: he argues that jurors—and especially black
jurors—ought to refuse to convict black defendants for some
nonviolent types of crime.13 Mr. Butler’s argument is that the
shockingly high incarceration rate for African-Americans relative
to their proportion of the country’s population gives strong
evidence of systemic racism in the American justice system,14 and
that such racism has proven insusceptible to standard channels
for change.15 Thus, he argues that juries ought not to convict
black defendants when they commit certain nonviolent crimes,16
in order to tip the balance in American law toward a more
equitable distribution of punishment across racial lines.17 As long
as black Americans are punished at multiple times the rate at
which white Americans are, nullification provides a necessary
thumb on the scale.
The Butler model thus operates as a form of affirmative action,
but one put in place by those affected by the injustice. Instead of
the majority attempting to inculcate greater equality, the
minority procures some measure of equality for itself. It’s what
See Butler, supra note 4, at 723–24.
Id. at 697 n.109 (citing U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Economics & Statistics
Admin., Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the U.S. 1994, at 13
(1994)) [hereinafter Statistical Abstract of the U.S.].
15 Paul D. Butler, Race-Based Jury Nullification: Case-in-Chief, 30 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 911, 922 (1997) (“I do not want to hear that AfricanAmericans should write to Congress. We tried that. It did not work. The house
that African-Americans live in is on fire, and when your house is on fire, you do
not write to Congress. You do not ask the people who set the fire to put it out;
you leave the building. That is what my proposal for selective jury nullification
encourages.”).
16 Butler specifically encourages nullification for black defendants accused of
drug possession. Id. at 920–21.
17
See id at 920–22.
13
14
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Butler calls “self-help,” 18 and it is a moral justification for
nullification in much the same way the above-mentioned “main”
justifications are. However, despite the fact that it is a rational,
moral response to a scientifically-observable problem,19 the Butler
model is not without its critics.
III. SOME OF THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST NULLIFICATION
There are legal scholars who oppose the power of juries to
nullify, some on narrow technical grounds, and others on broader,
more philosophical justifications. This section considers several
such arguments as they have been formulated by two prominent
critics of nullification.
A. The “Technical” Arguments
Illinois College of Law professor Andrew D. Leipold offers a
sharp criticism both of Butler’s model for nullification in
particular, and of nullification systems more broadly.20 Leipold
offers four arguments against nullification, none of them
particularly persuasive.21
Leipold’s first argument is what he calls a “technical” one: he
claims that if the Butler model gains popular support within the
black community, then the result will be that fewer black people
will serve on juries.22 According to Leipold, prosecutors would
strike black potential jurors if those potential jurors admitted
their predisposition to nullification, and that such strikes would
Id. at 912–13, 918, 920–21.
As recently as 2014, African Americans were incarcerated at five times
the rate of white Americans, and comprised 34% of the prison population
though they made up only 12% of the total population. See Criminal Justice
Fact Sheet, NAT’L ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE,
https://www.naacp.org/criminal-justice-fact-sheet/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2018); see
also Statistical Abstract of the U.S., supra note 13.
20 Andrew D. Leipold, Race-Based Jury Nullification: Rebuttal, 30 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 911, 923–24 (1997).
21 Id. at 923.
22 Id. at 923–24.
18
19
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survive a Batson challenge because they would be removals for
cause.23 This would be Leipold’s strongest argument, except that
it ignores both the facts of reality and the possibility of civil
disobedience.
First, Leipold’s no-black-jurors argument overlooks the fact
that prosecutors already routinely strike black jurors at an
“extraordinarily
disproportionate
rate,”
the
essentially24
unenforceable ruling in Batson notwithstanding.
Leipold may
as well be standing in Greensboro, North Carolina in 1960 and
cautioning against lunch counter sit-ins, lest lunch counter
proprietors respond to the protests by failing to serve black
patrons. The damage is here, now. It is already being done, so
the argument not to attempt a solution so as not to incur damage
fails as a matter of lived experience and common sense.
Further, the possibility of civil disobedience on the parts of
potential black jurors calls the basis of Leipold’s argument here
into question: prosecutors can only strike potential jurors for
cause if those jurors admit to their inclination toward
nullification. While nullification itself is a legal power of the jury
and thus not disobedience per se, the refusal to admit to potential
nullification during voir dire could be an act of civil disobedience
undertaken by the juror wishing to enact the Butler model.
It seems highly likely that a prospective juror motivated to use
her power of nullification in the interest of a greater social good
would be willing to commit perjury if necessary to hide her
intentions, in much the same way that lunch counter protesters
were willing to trespass in the interest of a similar social good
nearly sixty years earlier.25 Thus, Leipold’s “technical” warning
against Butler’s model of nullification founders on practical
ground.
23

Id.

24 Thomas Ward Frampton, The Jim Crow Jury, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1594,
1621–22 (2018); see Paul D. Butler, Race-Based Jury Nullification: Case-inChief, 30 J. Marshall L. Rev. 911, 922 (1997).
25 That the country is still fighting many of the same battles, just on a
different front, sixty years later may be what Professor Butler meant when he
said that the African-American house is on fire. See Butler, supra note 14.
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Leipold’s second “technical” argument similarly fails to survive
any serious inquiry. This second argument is that under normal
circumstances, juries do not have sufficient evidence before them
to make well-reasoned nullification decisions.26 That is, Leipold
claims that in order to approach the question of nullification, a
jury needs to weigh factors that are typically not available to it at
trial.27 However, this argument is problematic for two reasons.
First, Leipold’s critique assumes without providing evidence
that nullification requires extra facts beyond those ordinarily
available to the jury. Leipold provides a list of factors he
considers relevant, but does not provide any reason to believe that
jurors in fact require answers to the questions he poses. Neither
does he show that jurors need additional evidence of any kind to
nullify, beyond the same evidence they need to decide the facts at
trial. Without evidence that a jury actually requires facts not
normally available to it, this criticism appears circular: why does
the jury need extra facts to nullify? Because unless the jury has
extra facts, it cannot nullify! But why does the jury need extra
facts to nullify? And so on, in perpetuity. . . .
Second, if Leipold is suggesting that context matters, it seems
his argument is better-directed at the second traditional
justification for nullification (the unjustly-applied law) rather
than at a programmatic approach like the Butler model. It is
likely true that the former justification would require an
understanding of some of the facts of the defendant’s life and
circumstances. It is also likely that such facts would ordinarily
only be admissible if the defendant herself introduced them into
evidence. But there Leipold betrays another practical blind spot:
if there are mitigating personal circumstances in a defendant’s
case that call for the merciful application of law (such as
nullification), the defendant is likely to highlight those facts at
Leipold, supra note 20, at 924.
He lists five such factors: (1) whether the defendant is contrite; (2) the
existence (and severity) of her criminal record; (3) whether someone else ought
to be blamed for the crime; (4) the manner of enforcement (e.g., is there a racial
bias in the way this crime is enforced?), and; (5) what the range of possible or
likely sentences is. Id. at 924–25.
26
27
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trial.28 Thus, the problem of Leipold’s argument as it pertains to
“unjustly-applied law” nullification is that his argument once
again does not account for the realities of trial practice.
However, as an attack on the Butler model, Leipold’s second
technical argument misses the mark completely. The type of
nullification Butler advocates does not depend on the individual
“worthiness” of the defendant; it’s a social solution, aimed at a
social problem rather than at ascertaining the particular merits of
any one case. As such, Butler-type nullification does not require
any special investigation into the particular circumstance of a
defendant, so the argument that this kind of nullification cannot
proceed properly because the jury doesn’t have enough facts is
simply incoherent.
Directly or indirectly, that it is okay to engage in an
uninformed cost-benefit analysis, we have no moral basis for
complaining about any decision that a jury makes.”29 Well, no.
This argument is redolent of the foul sophistry of arguments
against gay marriage (there will be people marrying spoons!),30
and it fails for the same reason that every slippery-slope
argument fails: it is derelict in its application of logic.
In other words, it does not follow logically that by condoning
certain actions, society must necessarily condone all actions. Just
as society can embrace the robust exercise of civil liberties while
also condemning bestiality, so too can society embrace a measured
approach to equal justice while also condemning abuses of justice.
For example, a just treatment of nullification has no problem
condoning its use for defendants who harbored runaway slaves
while condemning its abuse in acquitting southern lynch mobs.
28 See, e.g., Ayestas v. Davis, 138 S. Ct. 1080, 1086 (2018); Hidalgo v.
Arizona, 138 S. Ct. 1054, 1054–55 (2018); Trevino v. Davis, 138 S. Ct. 1793,
1795 (2018).
29 Leipold, supra note 20, at 925 (emphasis added).
30 It is impossible to treat these arguments with less respect than they
deserve. For example, a religious organization calling itself the “Family
Research Council” managed, po-faced, to compare gay marriage to bestiality
while naming its pamphlet “The Slippery Slope.” Family Research Council, The
Slippery Slope of Same-Sex Marriage, (2004),
https://downloads.frc.org/EF/EF04C51.pdf.
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Nor does it take one hundred fifty years of hindsight to suss out
the difference between right and wrong: when the problem is as
dramatic as seeing one-third of a population in prison at some
point during their lifetime, 31 a just society may embrace a
commensurately dramatic solution.
The last of Leipold’s arguments is aimed directly at Butlertype nullification.
It is Leipold’s claim that the Butler
justification for nullification is philosophically suspect because,
like the racism that produced the problem it seeks to correct,
Butler’s solution is race-based. As Leipold puts it, “using race as
the reason for acquitting or convicting is a bad idea, and no
matter how strategic the reasoning and no matter how good our
intentions, it is still wrong.”32
This is perhaps the most pernicious argument. It is facially an
appeal to equal treatment regardless of skin color, which ought to
be the goal of any democratic system aimed at producing real
justice.
However, this argument also wilts under critical
examination, so completely that its surface-level nod at equality
seems little more than a head fake. Because under the skin of
this critique lies the sentiment that courts have “made significant
progress over the last twenty years,” so that therefore no dramatic
solution is needed.33
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. was familiar with this precise line
of thinking. He said that this wait, wait admonishment from
what he called the “white moderate” was “the great stumbling
block” across the path to equality, writing that the problem he
found most vexing
. . . is not the White Citizen's Counciler or the Ku
Klux Klanner, but the white moderate, who is more
31 According to a U.S. Department of Justice report from 2001, one-third of
black men born in 2001 will spend some part of their lives in prison. THOMAS P.
BONCZAR, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PREVALENCE OF IMPRISONMENT IN
THE U.S. POPULATION, 1974-2001, at 1 (Aug. 2003),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/piusp01.pdf.
32 Leipold, supra note 20, at 926.
33 Id.
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devoted to "order" than to justice; who prefers a
negative peace which is the absence of tension to a
positive peace which is the presence of justice; who
constantly says: “I agree with you in the goal you
seek, but I cannot agree with your methods of direct
action”; who paternalistically believes he can set the
timetable for another man's freedom; who lives by a
mythical concept of time and who constantly advises
the Negro to wait for a “more convenient season.”
Shallow understanding from people of good will is
more frustrating than absolute misunderstanding
from people of ill will.34
Leipold’s admonition that Butler’s self-help is unnecessary
because the legal system has made “significant progress” sounds
exactly like the paternalistic timetable set by Dr. King’s
frustrating white moderates. It’s a picture painted in a tall tower
by someone who has never set his white shoes on the street. It is
the preference of the absence of tension over the presence of
justice. It ought not be tolerated.
B. The “Philosophical” Arguments
But Leipold is not alone in his criticism of nullification.
Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals Judge Pamela Baschab
mounts a loosely-structured, loosely-reasoned jeremiad against
the practice.35
Judge Baschab’s curious central argument is that by
nullifying, jurors are “tak[ing] the law into their own hands.”36 As
though that were somehow wrong. As though the jurors had
actually taken anything. As though the law were not delivered,
ceremoniously, into their hands at the moment they were charged
34 Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from a Birmingham Jail (Apr. 16, 1963),
https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/Letter_Birmingham.html.
35
Judge Pamela Baschab, Jury Nullification: The Anti-Atticus, 65 ALA. LAW.
110, 112 (2004).
36 Id.
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to apply that law to the facts. This “taking the law into their own
hands” argument fails on three grounds: it is incoherent, it is
inconsistent with Judge Baschab’s own writing within the same
article, and it ignores the fact that the jury decisions Judge
Baschab decries may be not only permissible but necessary to the
interests of justice.
Judge Baschab complains that in criminal cases “the
unwise decision of the jury is final, cannot be reviewed, does not
have to be explained or defended, and provides no recourse for the
state or victims,” before asking, with a rhetorical flourish, “How
fair is that?”37 To which surely every thinking reader responds,
“Why, perfectly. It is perfectly fair, and moreover, it is the very
core, the bedrock fundamental principle of our country’s judicial
system, that in a jury trial the jury decides the case. To allow
otherwise would be to upend the very foundation upon which our
system of law is built!”
The argument that juries should not “take the law into their
own hands” is therefore incoherent. “Taking the law into their
own hands” is precisely what jurors are supposed to do. It is what
they are literally instructed to do; typical jury instructions include
the phrase “your job is to apply the law to the facts.” Thus, jurors
are specifically requested to decide whether the law applies to the
case before them.
Nullification, likewise, is a decision about whether the law
should apply in the present case. It is senseless to claim that a
decision made for one type of reason is acceptable, but that the
same decision made for a different type of reason is unacceptable.
Whether the justification for acquittal is formulated as “following
the law” or as “nullifying the law,” the actual work done is the
same: jurors are tasked with deciding whether the law applies to
the facts of a given case.
Yet Judge Baschab compounds this error of reasoning by
introducing a particular inconsistency. Early in her article she
writes that her “stock answer” to the question of whether a jury
made the right decision is to say, “whatever verdict [you] rendered
37

Id. at 113.
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is the truth and is correct by definition.”38 Yet the astute reader
will note that this proclamation comes just one page before her
characterization of some jury decisions as “unwise.”39
How can it be that whatever verdict the jury returns is both
true and correct, but also at the same time unwise? The
inconsistency here may be part and parcel of the failure to accord
to the jury the same measure of autonomous judgment Judge
Baschab reserves to the prosecutor. That discrepancy is the third
failure of her argument.
On the one hand, Judge Baschab decries the nullification
decision when rendered by the jury. But on the other, she writes
approvingly of the prosecutor’s discretion in deciding which
potential defendants to prosecute.40 But the prosecutor’s decision
whether or not to charge a person is perfectly parallel to the jury’s
decision to nullify; in both instances, the question is whether the
defendant (or potential defendant) ought to be punished for the
crime.
To accord that power to the prosecutor while denying it to the
jury is to preference institutional authority over the democratic
process. It is to say that it’s better to have one person in a
position of power than to have twelve. Given—for just one
example—the fact that prosecutors charge black defendants at
five times the rate they charge white defendants, the interests of
justice require that the jury be able to function as a
counterbalance.
To discourage nullification in the face of
prosecutorial discretion is to argue for an imbalanced system.
Having thus considered and disposed of several arguments
against nullification, it is appropriate now to turn to the question
of how to determine when nullification is proper.
IV. A METHOD FOR DETERMINING THE PERMISSIBILITY OF JURY
NULLIFICATION

Id. at 111.
Id. at 113.
40 Id.
38
39

16
There is a deep philosophical underpinning to the American
system of jurisprudence. It is woven into the fabric of the
American trial,41 and it recurs in attempts to codify the common
law and to promulgate black-letter rules. It is, of course, the
belief in justice, as both goal and arbiter. At its heart, the
American system is devoted to the quest for justice.42 At the same
time, the concept is invoked as a weighing method.43 Given its
special prominence in justifying the business of the courts and its
utility in guiding the courts’ decisions, the question of required
justice is surely adequate to the task of determining the propriety
of nullification, too.
The rule needn’t be overly complex. Juries should nullify when
justice so requires. By invoking the same rule underlying the
courts’ actions, it is possible to account for all four of the main
moral justifications considered above, as well as to rebut all the
arguments against nullification considered above. Antebellum
juries were correct to nullify in Fugitive Slave Act cases: justice
required it. A jury should nullify in the case of the parent who
breaks and enters in order to save her dying child: justice requires
it. The OJ Simpson jury was within its proper bounds to rebuke
the racist overreach of the police via nullification: justice required
it. And juries attempting to balance the scales of justice by
refusing to convict nonviolent black defendants while those
defendants are charged at multiple times the rates of white
defendants are practically obligated by this rule to do so, for
justice requires it.
The health of the American legal system depends on the notion
that twelve ordinary people are capable of applying the law to the
facts and returning a just verdict. It is therefore not a bridge too
41 It is also, without special comment until now, woven into the fabric of this
article.
42 Consider, for example, the phrase “Equal Justice Under Law” and its
placement at the very entrance to the nation’s highest court.
43 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2) (“The court should freely give leave [to
amend a pleading] when justice so requires”) (emphasis added); FED. R. EVID.
104(c)(3) (“The court must conduct any hearing on a preliminary question so
that the jury cannot hear it if . . . justice so requires”) (emphasis added).
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far to suggest that those same twelve people are also able to
determine when and whether justice requires a particular
decision. Every pattern jury instruction should therefore come
with the clear proviso that the jury’s job is to apply the law to the
facts and then come to whatever decision it determines is required
by justice. Such a proviso would clarify the jury’s proper role,
bring it into alignment with the goals and methods of the rest of
the justice system, and begin to address the rampant racial
inequality Professor Butler and others seek to remedy.
CONCLUSION
Jury nullification is an inherent power of the jury, born of the
very foundational substance of the body itself. It is not granted to
juries by statute nor by accident of history; instead, it is a power
imbued in the jury by its very nature.
When deciding when and whether they ought to nullify, juries
can use a simple, sturdy framework that has served our legal
system well in numerous other contexts: juries ought to nullify
when justice so requires.
Because the power to nullify is intrinsic to the jury, and
because its exercise has the potential to fight systemic injustice in
a way few other mechanisms can, juries ought to use their power
of nullification rather than let this important mechanism for
administering justice be wasted through disuse.
In the present state of the system, it isn’t only a good idea:
justice requires it.

